To understand what is happening in Tripoli must first consider the strategic framework. We are not addressed in the face of spontaneous, but induced aiming to replicate what happened in North Africa in the late eighties in the former Soviet Union. Even then, the revolt started from a small Country, Lithuania, and at first no one imagined that the fire could spread to neighboring countries and it was even conceivable that the USSR would implode. The Maghreb is not the Soviet Union and there is no superstructure to blow up, but otherwise the similarities are obvious. Tunisia is the smallest of the countries of the region and served as a catalyst for the other times. A wheel fell on the Mubarak regime, Libya is in turmoil, Iran and maybe tomorrow, maybe on the wave, Algeria, Morocco, Syria. What had in common schemes Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian? Being ruled by authoritarian leaders, now old, discredited, they thought of spending power in children or inept loyalists.
It is no secret: the riots were widely encouraged - and in many ways prepared - by the U.S. government. For some time, Washington believed the inevitable explosion of popular discontent and fearing it will lead the revolt could be extremists or Islamic extremist groups, has made what looks like a controlled explosion, at least in Egypt and Tunisia. Why is it controlled? Because before you embarrass Ben Ali and Mubarak, the Obama administration has cemented the already rock-solid relationship with the armies, which in fact never lost control of the situation and were the architects of the revolution. Do not Forget it: oggi al Cairo e a Tunisi comandano i generali, che anche in futuro eserciteranno un’influenza decisiva. Washington ha vinto due volte: si è assicurata per molti anni a venire la fedeltà di questi due Paesi e ha messo a segno una straordinaria operazione di immagine, dimostrando al mondo intero che l’America è dalla parte del popolo e della democrazia anche in regimi fino a ieri amici.
Le dinamiche libiche sono diverse perché Gheddafi non era un alleato degli Stati Uniti e perché le Ong legate al governo americano non hanno potuto stabilire contatti e legami con la società civile libica; insomma, non hanno potuto fertilizzare il terreno sul quale far germogliare la rivolta. Che però è esplosa lo stesso. Per contagio e alimentando non la fedeltà dell’esercito, ma il suo malcontento. Come in tutte le rivoluzioni sono le forze armate a determinare l’esito delle rivolte popolari. Gheddafi in queste ore paga gli errori commessi in passato. Come ha rilevato Domenico Quirico sulla Stampa, il Colonnello, da vecchio golpista qual’era, non si è mai fidato dei generali e ha proceduto a numerose purghe. Gli uomini in divisa per 42 anni lo hanno temuto, ma non lo hanno mai davvero amato. Così ora molti di loro o si danno alla fuga o passano con i rivoltosi soprattutto nelle città lontane da Tripoli. Gheddafi può contare solo sulle milizie private e su una piccola parte dell’esercito; è questa la ragione di una mossa altrimenti inspiegabile come to recruit hundreds or perhaps thousands of African militiamen.
The consequence is inevitable: blood, blood and more blood. The impression is that Qaddafi will ultimately be forced to flee. The image, ridiculous, to raise in a car with an umbrella is reminiscent of Saddam Hussein being hunted by the Americans in the days of the fall of Baghdad. In any case, the situation could be very embarrassing for Italy. If the regime falls, Libya would again be the port of departure for our coastline for tens of thousands of immigrants. If you were to stand, it would be embarrassing for us to maintain good relations with a bloodthirsty leader. And in both cases dance contracts for millionaires our companies. Eni in the head. Let us not forget: Most of our energy supply depends on its own from North Africa. The explosion "controlled" is likely to be, however, devastating to the interests of our country.
We have no choice and Italy certainly can not influence events, but the question is inevitable: the price is right?
Di Marcello Foa, 02/22/2011
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